Assessing the Effectiveness of IMF Structural Conditionality by Lamdany Ruben & Ruben Lamdany
133
Assessing the Effectiveness of IMF 
Structural Conditionality
I. Introduction
This paper(1) assesses the effectiveness of structural conditionality in 
bringing about reforms in structural policies in countries undertaking a program 
financed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To this end, it tries to 
respond to the following three questions: how significant would policy changes 
be if program conditions were met; how often are these conditions met; and to 
what extent do these conditions serve as a catalyst or at least as a stepping-stone 
to promote reform in the sectors on which they are imposed. 
IMF lending has always been made contingent on conditions that would 
provide assurance to borrowing member countries that committed resources 
would be available to them upon compliance with agreed policies and to give the 
IMF confidence that the country will be able to repay (Guitián, 1981). Through 
the 1970s, conditionality was almost solely set on variables that reduced 
demand, as a means to improve the balance of payments with the expectation 
that lower inflation and better fiscal balances would mitigate adverse effects on 
growth over the longer term (Goldstein and Montiel, 1986). Beginning in the 
mid-1980s, lending was increasingly made conditional on structural reforms. 
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These structural conditions are set on variables affecting the supply side of the 
economy, and are aimed at strengthening the sustainability of macroeconomic 
adjustment while relaxing the need for contractionary demand-side measures. 
However, use of structural conditionality evoked growing criticism as its scope 
and volume widened over time. Critics were concerned about the legitimacy of 
the IMF setting conditions outside the areas of its core mandate and competence, 
and they saw structural conditionality as intrusive and taxing local capacity (e.g., 
Action Aid, 2004; Eurodad, 2006; Oxfam, 2006).
There is a considerable body of literature on the purpose, design, 
effectiveness and impact of structural conditionality. Drazen (2002) sees 
structural conditions as a useful tool for governments to demonstrate their 
commitment to sustainable macroeconomic stability. James (1998) and Mussa 
and Savastano (1999) study the use of conditionality by donors to further their 
goals and aid agendas, while Martin (2006) focuses on conditionality as an 
accountability tool for donors. Goldstein (2000) shows that conditionality can 
assist authorities in setting and sustaining domestic priorities.
On the other hand, Killick (1997, 1998) argues that conditionality fails to 
achieve compliance and its intended outcomes. Kanbur (2000), Dollar (2001), 
and Villanger (2004) offer various arguments as to why conditionality is not 
always a good enforcement tool for donor programs. Giustiniani and Kronenberg 
(2005) argue that by the mid-1990s it was increasingly recognized that excessive 
structural conditionality “could undermine national ownership of a policy 
program, strain administrative capacity, and weaken implementation of policies 
that are truly essential.” These latter two issues, the extent of compliance and the 
ability of conditionality to bring about lasting policy changes, are the focus of 
this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a 
description of structural conditionality in Fund-supported programs approved 
between 1995–2004, including how conditions were distributed across categories 
of structural depth. Section III discusses compliance with structural conditions; 
and Section IV presents an assessment of the extent to which structural 
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conditionality was followed by additional reforms in the corresponding sector. 
Section V presents the main conclusions of the study.
II. Structural Conditions: How much change would they bring 
about?
This section provides a description of structural conditionality in Fund-
supported programs, including the sectoral distribution of those conditions and 
the degree of structural change that they would bring about if implemented. 
In this paper, structural conditions are defined as those conditions included in 
IMF programs that are not specific quantitative targets related to the financial 
programming. Structural conditionality was pervasive during the period studied 
(1995–2004). There were over 7,000 structural conditions in the 216 programs 
approved during this period for 94 countries, with an average of 17 conditions 
per year of program. 
These conditions spanned across most sectors in the economy and 
they covered changes in legislation, policies, and the structure of economic 
incentives, as well as institutional reform. About two-thirds of all structural 
conditions were concentrated in sectors that constitute the core areas of IMF 
mandate and expertise (the “core”), including taxation, public expenditure 
management, financial sector reform, and issues related to exchange rate and 
monetary policy. The other one-third of the conditions focused on areas over 
which the IMF has much less expertise (“non-core”), primarily state-owned 
enterprise reform, privatization, social policies, and civil service reform. Table 1 
shows the sectoral distribution of conditionality over the period.
Structural conditions vary in the degree and durability of the structural 
change that they would bring about if implemented. Some conditions may entail 
little or no structural change (i.e., one-off, easily reversible measures such as 
raising the price of gasoline) while others may have a profound and lasting 
effect (i.e., a comprehensive reform of the labor market). In order to get a sense 
of their degree of structural depth (SD), we classified all the conditions into 
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three categories(2):
• Little or No SD (0). This category includes conditions that would not, 
by themselves, bring about any economic changes, neither structural nor 
macro. Some of these conditions may serve as stepping stones to significant 
reforms, but this would require follow-up action.(3) Examples of little or 
no SD include the preparation or announcement of plans, strategies, or 
legislation; the definition of rules, drafting or submission of legislation to 
Congress, and the hiring of consultants to perform agreed upon tasks. 
• Limited SD (1). This category includes conditions calling for one-off 
measures that could be expected to have an immediate and possibly 
significant effect, but that would need to be followed by other measures 
in order for this effect to be lasting. It encompasses conditions of two 
main types: those requiring one-off fiduciary measures, and quasi-macro 
quantitative conditionality. Examples of the former include the publication, 
by a given date, of the federal budget or the accounts of public enterprises, 
or the preparation of specific audits. Examples of quasi-macro quantitative 
conditionality include changes in controlled prices, limits on the growth 
of a wage bill, or the reduction of arrears of certain public enterprises. 
Other examples in this intermediate category include conditions leading 
to the establishment of a pilot system or project and the implementation 
of existing legislation or regulations. One particularly important condition 
included in this category is the approval of a specific budget law. This is a 
legislative action, but it is a “one-off” event in that it must be undertaken 
yearly.
• High SD (2). This category includes conditions that, by themselves, would 
bring about long-lasting changes in the institutional environment. Most of 
the conditions in this category entail legislative changes (e.g., approval, 
Each category was assigned a numerical rating which was used to calculate the average 
structural depth of  different types of conditions, as reported in Table 1.
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adoption, or enactment of legislation by a parliament). This category also 
includes conditions requiring that certain fiduciary measures be taken on a 
regular and/or permanent basis, even when legislation is not needed (often 
these measures are implemented through regulation). Examples of such 
measures are similar in substance to conditions with limited SD, but are 
expected to have effects that are more lasting. This category also includes 
conditions with long-lasting structural impact that may be grounded in pre-
existing legislation but that probably could not be undone without new 
legislation, e.g., implementing civil service reform or privatization.
Data from a sample of 43 programs approved between 1999 and 2003 were 
used to analyze the structural depth of conditions based on the classification 
outlined above.(4) Each of the approximately 1500 conditions in these programs 
was assessed twice by two different economists, with a third economist 
reviewing those cases that had received different SD ratings. The classification 
was done with a bias towards ascribing to each condition the highest possible 
SD rating. There was sufficient information for about 1,300 conditions (87%) to 
be able to rate them. The results are presented in Table 1 and in Figure 1. Only 
4 percent of conditions were rated as having High SD, and more than 40% as 
having little or no SD. The overall distributional pattern is broadly similar for 
conditions in core and non-core areas, but the average SD appears to be higher 
for the core sectors, indicating that the Fund was supporting more ambitious 
sectoral reforms in the sectors of its core competence. 
The period was truncated at 2003 to avoid selecting programs that could still have been 
ongoing at the time of the study. These programs accounted for 1,567 of the 3,652 conditions 
in the 103 programs that were approved during that period, and the analysis was based on the 
1,306 conditions for which there was information on  relevant variables used for assessment. 
The sectoral distribution of conditions in this sample is not significantly different from that 
for the universe of programs approved during 1995-2004. Thirty of the 43 programs were 
chosen randomly and the remaining 13 were selected from a stratified sample used to create 
a representative set of countries used for in-depth case studies, which focus on issues not 
discussed in this paper.
(4)
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III. Are structural conditions being complied with?
This section analyzes compliance with structural conditionality in IMF-
supported programs. It also examines the extent to which compliance varies 
across sectors and whether it is related to the structural depth of conditions. 
The documentation for IMF arrangements (i.e., IMF loans) specifies the actions 
that the authorities need to take and the dates by which these actions need to 
be taken for the funds in the corresponding tranche to be made available. If all 
conditions are complied with, i.e. met as agreed, the borrower can draw the 
corresponding tranche on the agreed date. Otherwise, the borrower may seek 
waivers from the IMF Board of Directors. Waivers are sought for late or partial 
compliance, and sometimes to altogether avoid having to make the agreed upon 
changes. The Board of Directors reviews the state of the program based on 
recommendations from IMF management, and decides how to proceed in regard 
to each condition that has not been complied with. Also during these reviews, 
modifications are made to conditions for future tranches, allowing programs 
to adapt to changing circumstances. Often the need for waivers leads to delays 
in tranche disbursement, but the program eventually goes back on-track. 
Sometimes, however, waivers are not granted and the program goes permanently 
off-track and is terminated. In this case, the authorities would need to request 
and negotiate a new arrangement or loan. 
About half of the 7,000 structural conditions during the period being studied 
were complied with on time. This compares with over 80 percent compliance 
for quantitative macro conditions (IMF, 2005). Another 25 percent of structural 
conditions were complied with etiher late, only in part or with modifications.(5) 
The data do not allow for distinguishing the extent of late compliance nor 
whether conditions were eventually met as agreed or modified. These figures are 
drawn from a database that only includes the conditions in programs that were 
As part of a waiver request, borrowers sometimes substitute a particular measure with a 
different one that would have similar macroeconomic impact, even if the structural impact 
would be very different. For example, the sale of a state-owned enterprise might be substituted 
by an increase in the value-added tax that is projected to bring a similar impact on revenues.
(5)
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eventually completed. The compliance rate would be much lower if it included 
programs that went off-track.(6) Compliance rates were significantly higher for 
conditions in the core sectors (60 percent compliance in core sectors versus 
39 percent in non-core). One possible explanation is that monetary and fiscal 
authorities, the IMF’s main counterparts, were better able to oversee and track 
compliance with conditions in areas under their responsibility but found it more 
difficult to manage this process in other, non-core areas. 
The analysis on the interaction between compliance and structural depth 
was conducted based on data from the sample of 43 programs discussed above, 
since this information is only available for these programs (Table 2).  As noted 
above, this is a representative sample, and total and sectoral compliance rates 
for these 43 programs are similar to the rates for the whole universe of 216 
programs.  Compliance rates were much lower (at less than one-third) for 
conditions with high SD —probably because these conditions are in general 
more difficult to implement. About one-quarter of all structural conditions had 
significant or limited SD and were complied with. Again, this proportion was 
greater in core sectors. This compliance rate rises only to about 40 percent when 
allowing for conditions that were only partially met or met after a delay. It is 
surprising that compliance rates were so low, especially because almost half the 
conditions did not require policy or institutional changes.
IV. Structural Conditionality: A weak catalyst for reform
This section examines whether structural conditionality was effective in 
bringing about follow-up structural reforms, as well as whether reforms were 
sustained over time. It assesses whether there was a link between compliance 
with conditionality and its effectiveness at securing durable reform, and whether 
the relationship between compliance and effectiveness varies according to 
the degree of structural depth of the measures. To avoid intractable causality 
On the other hand, the data do not include prior actions, which in this sample are met by 
definition. Including them would raise compliance to over 60 percent.
(6)
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problems, the analysis asked whether structural conditions had been a step 
within a broader sectoral reform —i.e., whether compliance with a particular 
condition was followed by additional reforms in the corresponding sector—but 
it did not try to establish a direct causal link. Admittedly, this criterion is a very 
low threshold for establishing effectiveness, since it links specific conditions 
to sectoral reforms that may be only marginally (if at all) connected to the 
corresponding condition, and with reforms that may have taken place without 
conditionality.
The analysis, which was based on data from the 43 sample programs 
described in previous sections, was conducted by assessing whether further 
reforms took place to advance the explicit or implicit objectives in sectors 
covered by structural conditionality. For each condition we asked whether it 
was complied with, and what was the average compliance for conditions in the 
corresponding sector. We then looked at the information available for the period 
after the program and asked whether additional reforms took place in this sector, 
or whether the reform had stalled or backtracked. An individual condition was 
deemed effective if reform continued in the corresponding sector following 
compliance with that condition. For conditions whose compliance completed 
a reform, mostly conditions with high SD, the effectiveness test was whether 
reversals had taken place. 
To conduct this analysis it is necessary to have information on what 
were the explicit or implicit goals were of the sectoral reforms in which the 
conditionality was embedded (to assess whether there was further progress), 
and on what happened after the program was concluded. For each of the 
43 programs, sectoral objectives were identified for each sector covered by 
structural conditionality. Sometimes this information could be found in the 
Staff Report, i.e., the loan document. In other cases, a sectoral strategy had to 
be gleaned from the description of the overall program. The assessment of the 
impact of structural conditionality beyond compliance was based on information 
provided in different IMF reports, mainly the staff report for the first Article 
IV consultation after expiration of programs, Ex-Post Assessments of the 
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corresponding program, and in  follow-up program documents when relevant. 
The information, therefore, covered a period of between one and one and one 
half years after the completion of the program. For some conditions and the 
corresponding sectors, the assessment of follow-up reforms was based on very 
limited information, especially for conditions linked to late tranches in programs 
approved in 2003. For others, e.g., for conditions from the start of the early 
programs, there was information on sectoral reforms that took place over four 
years after their implementation. 
The sectoral follow up was rated based on the identified sectoral goals 
and using the post-program information. The ratings were 1 when the sectoral 
goals were achieved in a durable manner or when further reform took place in 
the intended direction, -1 when the outcome of a condition that had been met 
was eventually reversed, and 0 when sectoral reform efforts stalled. There were 
229 sectors(7) with at least one structural condition for which an effectiveness 
rating could be given. Additional reforms took place beyond the program in 
about half of the sectors (53 percent) with at least one condition. In the other 
half, the reform efforts either stalled (37 percent) or were reversed (10 percent). 
The about 50 percent follow-up figure has an upward bias since in many cases 
the specific conditions were not connected with the sectoral reforms that took 
place subsequently. This bias is not present in regard to reversals, where the 
figure refers to the specific measures that were taken. Conditionality in core 
sectors was more likely to be followed up by additional reforms than in non-core 
sectors. Effectiveness was also measured at the level of individual conditions. In 
other words, each of the 1,300 assessed conditions was awarded an effectiveness 
score based on the overall score for its sector. Again, positive effectiveness 
scores were more common in core sectors.
Is high compliance a good predictor of meaningful, durable reform? Does 
this depend on the structural depth of the measures subject to conditionality? 
(7) Potentially, there could have been up to 387 sectors, if there would have been at least one 
condition in each of the nine possible sectors in each of the 43 countries. The number 229 
means that on average there were about 5 sectors covered in each program.
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The analysis showed only a weak link between compliance with structural 
conditionality and effectiveness at bringing about reform and ensuring its 
durability. In fact, the probability of further reform in a sector covered by 
conditionality was not affected by whether conditions had been met as agreed, 
met partially or after a delay or not met at all. Two sets of correlations were 
estimated to measure the link between compliance and effectiveness. The first 
was at the sectoral level using compliance rates and effectiveness scores for 
229 sectoral observations. The second set measured the same relationship at 
the individual condition level assigning each of them the effectiveness measure 
awarded to its respective sector. Neither set of tests revealed a significant 
correlation between compliance and the indicator of effectiveness. Similarly, 
no significant correlation was found between structural depth of conditions and 
their effectiveness, in terms to leading to further reforms in the sector.(8)
V. Main Conclusions
This study explored the effectiveness of IMF structural conditionality at 
bringing about durable policy reforms. There was extensive use of structural 
conditionality in IMF-supported programs during the 1995–2004 period, with 
an average of 17 conditions per program/year. These conditions covered most 
sectors in the economy and required borrowing countries to undertake certain 
actions before they could receive financial support. These actions ranged from 
institutional reforms and changes in legislation, to setting up teams or making 
announcements. Two-thirds of conditions were set in the core areas of IMF 
expertise and responsibility, such as public expenditure management and tax-
related issues.
The study found that fewer than 5 percent of the structural conditions 
(8) In fact, structural conditionality with high SD had a higher than average rate of policy reversals 
(more than 10 percent as compared to 6 percent for the whole sample). This may be due to a 
selectivity bias, i.e., the IMF may be more inclined to ask for conditions with high SD when 
the authorities’ ownership of the reforms is low or when the underlying situation is particularly 
difficult. 
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called for lasting structural reforms, and only one-third of these were complied 
with. More than 40 percent of conditions only called for preparing plans or 
drafting legislation. In view of these figures, it is surprising that only about half 
of all conditions were met as agreed. Moreover, there was only a weak link 
between compliance with structural conditionality and subsequent reforms in 
the corresponding sector—a weak measure of the effectiveness of conditions in 
bringing about reform. Compliance and effectiveness were higher in the areas of 
IMF core competency, but even there compliance was only 60 percent. 
The findings of this study raise questions about the usefulness of 
structural conditionality. The low compliance rate with conditions and the 
low degree of change that they would bring about if implemented suggest that 
structural conditionality did not play a critical role in providing borrowers 
with assurances on the availability of resources. It is also unclear how low 
structural depth conditionality could play a role in safeguarding Fund resources. 
The low correlation of compliance with continued policy changes beyond 
the program calls into question the usefulness of structural conditionality in 
fostering medium-term external viability and sustainable growth. At the same 
time, the large number of conditions was widely criticized as intruding in the 
policymaking process and detracting from society’s sense of ownership of 
programs. These are perhaps some of the reasons why there have been recurrent 
calls both within and outside the IMF for a drastic reduction in the volume and 
scope of structural conditionality.
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Table 1. Distribution of Structural Conditions by Sector and Structural 
Depth
(43 case studies from 1999-2003)1/
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Figure 1: Distribution of Structural Conditions by Structural Depth
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<Summary>
Ruben Lamdany
This paper assesses the effectiveness of structural conditionality in bringing 
about changes in structural policies in countries undertaking IMF-financed 
programs during 1995–2004.  Structural conditions were pervasive during this 
period, with an average of 17 conditions per program/year, and they elicited 
strong criticism as being intrusive and undermining government ownership of 
economic programs. 
The study found that fewer than 5 percent of the structural conditions called 
for lasting structural reforms, and only one-third of these were complied with. 
Overall, only about half of the conditions were met on time, and there was only 
a weak link between compliance with structural conditionality and subsequent 
reforms in the corresponding sector —a weak measure of the effectiveness of 
conditions in bringing about reform. Compliance and effectiveness were higher 
in the areas of IMF core competency, such as public expenditure management 
and tax-related issues, and lower in areas such as privatization and reform of 
the wider public sector, but even there compliance was only 60 percent. These 
findings raise questions about the usefulness of structural conditionality in 
promoting reform, in providing borrowers with assurances on the availability of 
resources, as well as in safeguarding IMF resources.
